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Employed technologies differ vastly across countries. Within countries
many technologies that would obviously improve firms’ efficiency are not
adopted. This paper explains these observations by emphasizing that a
new technology positively affects workers by lowering prices and
increasing their real income, but also negatively by costs of getting
acquainted with the new technology. If the costs of adoption for workers
exceed the benefits, they will aim at keeping the old technology in place.
We formalise the trade-off in a simple OLG model with majority voting.
Age groups that lose from adopting resist. Successful resistance blocks
adoption and hence lowers growth. Finally, we analyse the effects of
tougher competition. Provided that consumption and leisure are relatively
good substitutes, tougher competition mitigates resistance and thus
favours economic growth as it increases the share of the rent associated
with the new technology that is being captured by the workers.
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Abstract
Employed technologies differ vastly across countries. Within countries
many technologies that would obviously improve firms’ efficiency are
not adopted. This paper explains these observations by emphasizing that
a revolutionary new technology positively affects workers by lowering
prices and increasing their real income, but also negatively by costs of
getting acquainted with the new technology. If the costs of adoption for
workers exceed the benefits, they will aim at keeping the old technology
in place. We formalize the trade-off in a simple OLG model with
majority voting. Age groups that lose from adopting resist. Successful
resistance blocks adoption and hence lowers growth. Finally, we analyse
the effects of tougher competition. Provided that consumption and
leisure are relatively good substitutes, tougher competition mitigates
resistance and thus favours economic growth as it increases the share of
the rent associated with the new technology that is being captured by the
workers.
1. Introduction
Do firms in the same industry apply the same and best-practice technology? Do all
countries use the same technology? The answers to these questions are obvious:
Technologies employed by different firms and in different countries differ tremendously,
even in modern times with the huge advances in travel and communication technology.
“Germans have been shocked by the weak technical standards in Britain” is not a quote
from decades or centuries ago, but actually from 1998.  Such differences in technology
1
are hard to understand by relying on the standard view on technology that treats
technology as a public good that is accessible to everybody at no cost. The question
becomes urgent why not everybody is employing best-practice technologies, even
though these technologies are known and yield, by standard means of calculation, a      See for example Howarth and Andersson (1993), Jaffe and Stavins (1994) and Sutherland
2
(1991).
      Localized technological progress (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1996, Stiglitz, 1987, and Antonelli,
3
1995) or appropriate technology as Basu and Weil (1996) call it, provides a potential micro-economic
foundation for the specificity of knowledge. The basic idea of localized learning is simple: learning-by-
doing or innovation does not shift the total isoquant inward, but only the part that is actually used
(hence where the initial technology choice was optimal given the factor prices). So with different factor
endowments a poor country is unable to acquire total factor productivity levels of a rich country, as the
technology requires the factor endowments of rich countries.
[ 2 ]
positive  net present value. In, for example, the field of environmental economics, much
attention has been paid to this seemingly paradoxical evidence that firms do not employ
those environmentally friendly technologies that, according to standard calculations,
yield positive net present values. This paradox is often referred to as the ‘energy
efficiency paradox’ and has given rise to an extensive literature trying to resolve it.
2
Several explanations have been explored. Firstly, technology could be localized,
meaning that the technology is available but useless with the given production
technique.  This perspective explains why a seemingly better technology may actually
3
not be superior in specific circumstances. Such a perspective might shed light on cross-
country differences between widely different countries, but does not explain why in
seemingly similar countries best-practice technologies are not implemented. Secondly,
asymmetric information resulting in capital market imperfections, or information costs
resulting in bounded rational behaviour might explain seemingly sub-optimal behaviour.
Thirdly, uncertainty with respect to future pay-offs may prevent firms from investing
given that the investments are often to a large extent irreversible (for example, Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994).
The perspective we take in this paper is one in which we argue that adoption of
a major new technology is costly. Jovanovic (1995) argues, for example, that adoption
costs outweigh invention costs roughly a factor 20 or 30 to 1. Also, evidence that
diffusion lags for new technologies are long suggests that sizeable adoption costs are
at work. Opposite to common approaches (for example, Parente 1995, Parente and
Prescott, 1994), we focus on the costs that workers have to bear. Alongside firms’
installation and instruction costs, workers have to learn to use the new technology. An
example is a training program for a new technology that will be offered to employees
during normal leisure hours instead of during working time. In the latter case, training[ 3 ]
hours effectively reduce production time so that firms bear the costs in terms of
foregone production. In the former case it is the employee who has less leisure time left.
Hence, the distribution of the adoption costs among different groups of workers, as well
as among firms on the one hand and workers on the other is relevant. In this paper, we
focus on these distributional issues.
The story this paper tells is simple. First, the net benefits from adopting a
revolutionary new technology may be unevenly distributed among workers when
workers are heterogeneous. The heterogeneity is captured by differences with respect
to age. Older workers could be more hesitant to a new technology since they have to
go through a costly learning process, whereas they are not able to reap the full benefits
from working with the new technology. Young workers are more willing to accept a
new technology since they can recover the cost of training more easily, simply because
their remaining lifetime is longer. Second, the share that workers get of the rent that is
associated with improving the technology will generally differ from the share that the
firm gets. This difference may depend on, for example, the competitiveness of the
industry in which firms are operating (an idea that is also present in Aghion and Howitt,
1998, and Prescott, 1998). Once a majority of the workers calculates that the net
benefits of the new technology are negative, they will block the new technology by a
majority vote over the allowance for the new technology. We thereby explicitly
recognize that a firm is a collection of individuals, which cannot be modelled as an
entity with a single mind. Although we model the decision to adopt a technology by
voting, one might as well think of it as a decision influenced by resistance activities. In
the most general interpretation, these activities include threats of worker disobedience,
threats of consumer boycotts, loss of political sympathy, etc.
The idea that new technologies or innovations are met with resistance is not
new. As Machiavelli (1961, p. 51) pointed out, “There is nothing more difficult to
arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through, than to initiate
a new order of things. ... Men are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things
unless they have tested them by experience.” In a similar spirit, Schumpeter argued that
“… in the case of something new being attempted, the environment resists while it
looks on with – at least – benevolent neutrality at repetition of familiar acts. Resistance[ 4 ]
may consist in simple disapproval – of machine-made products, for instance – in
prevention – prohibition of the use of new machinery – aggression – smashing new
machinery.” (1939, p. 100, italics added). Though in our formal analysis the focus is on
voting over prohibition, the broader interpretation should be kept in mind when
evaluating the results.
The basic conclusion we arrive at in this paper is that new technologies that
carry a substantial cost, that is necessarily borne by workers, are unlikely to be adopted.
Moreover, in anti-competitive environments it is more likely that a new technology is
resisted as the share of the rent associated with the new technology that accrues to
workers is relatively small, making them more hesitant towards adoption.
The analysis adds to the literature on population ageing by emphasizing the
relation between age distribution and technology adoption: economic growth may be
reduced in an ageing society as the willingness to adopt new technologies is decreasing
in remaining lifetime. Hence, the paper provides a complementary perspective on
problems related to the age distribution of the population - besides issues in relation
with savings and pensions.
The analysis in this paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses
historical and anecdotical evidence on resistance to technological change. Section 3
presents the model we develop to analyse the adoption of technology and discusses the
most important assumptions. The basic framework is as simple as possible. Hence
initially we abstain from issues related to entry and exit of firms, endogenous supply of
labour, and endogenous costs of learning to use the new technology. These assumptions
will be discussed and relaxed later on. The trade-offs different generations face and the
way in which the generational composition of the economy affects the likeliness of a
technology being blocked by workers is discussed in section 4. Attention will also be
paid to endogenizing learning costs. Section 5 evaluates the impact of competition
policy. Having discussed the basic model, we turn to some extensions in sections 6 and
7. In particular, section 6 analyses the model under free entry (and thus an
endogenously determined number of firms). In section 7 we study the robustness of the
characteristics of the model by allowing for a more general utility function. Section 8
concludes and discusses some potential extensions of the simple framework developed      Though obvious, the necessity of distinguishing between groups that tend to lose and groups
4
that tend to win from technological progress immediately reveals that a symmetric, homogeneous-agent
framework is insufficient for our purpose.
[ 5 ]
in this paper.
2. Resistance to technology
This section argues by means of anecdotical and descriptive historical evidence, that
resistance to technology is a potentially powerful explanation for the lack of
implementation of “best-practice” technologies. A convenient framework for the
analysis of resistance to technological change distinguishes three separate but related
layers. First, as technological progress can be viewed as a positive-sum game, it is not
immediately obvious that resistance should arise at all. For resistance to arise there
should be losers alongside the winners.  Hence, the first layer explores the underlying
4
incentives for resistance activities. The second layer explores the action of resistance,
hence whether the incentive for resistance fulminates in, for example, violence,
regulations or unionism. The third layer consists of the consequences of the actions
taken, namely the dynamic and static inefficiencies that arise due to effective resistance.
Section 2.1 explores, by means of analysing descriptive (historical) material,
mostly the second perspective, that is, what type of resistance will lead to non-adoption
of technology. Section 2.2 discusses theoretical approaches to the economics of
technology resistance. This is a literature that deals rather implicit with the actual
resistance activity and focuses on the incentives and resulting inefficiencies.
2.1 Resistance
The failure to adopt new technologies may derive from various sources. The first and
historically very relevant obstacle to the adoption of new technology is violence and
effort to get political acclaim for the request to stick to the status quo in production
technology. A difference in the extent and success of resistance to technology is one of      Mokyr warns not to identify machine breaking, commonly observed early in the Industrial
5
Revolution, with resistance to technology. More often this was simply a sign of a labour dispute, as
machines were a vulnerable target.
      Actually, in Britain destruction of machinery was made a felony punishable by death.
6




the, admittedly many, pieces of the puzzle of why the Industrial Revolution occurred
in Britain and not on the Continent. A piece, moreover, that is “barely…explored” and
“dimly understood” (Mokyr, 1990, p. 255, 266). The Industrial Revolution brought
gains to consumers and a few innovators, while the costs were mostly borne by skilled
artisans. On the Continent “the old urban guilds became a fetter on technological
progress” (p. 258) and workers rioted against spinning machines imported from
Britain.  The guilds resisted less by outright violence and riots, but more through a vast
5
body of regulations and restrictions. Though resistance was eventually blown over, it
retarded the introduction of new technologies on the Continent substantially. A
potential explanation for less successful resistance in Britain is the fact that the ruling
class had most of its assets in real estate and agriculture; assets whose value was not
threatened to be reduced by technological progress. Hence, the British ruling class had
no interest in granting workers’ claims for resistance (Mokyr, 1990).
6
Second, obstacles to the adoption of new technologies may be unions that, by
acting in favour of their members, resist labour saving projects. Examples are found in
the textile industry in India (Wolcott, 1994) where workers had less incentive to adapt
and more ability to resist to the introduction of labour saving technologies. Another
example is the United States coal mining industry where strong unions were able to
resist technological breakthroughs until they were pressed to give up their resistance
due to the availability of cheap oil (Prescott, 1998).
A third, currently most pressing, source of the failures to adopt best-practice
technologies derives from regulations and laws that formally prevent technological
improvements. Their importance is well established in Baily (1993) and Baily and
Gersbach (1995). Baily studies productivity differences in service industries  operating
7
in Europe, the United States and Japan, and evaluates the role of certain types of      Nine industries (automobiles, automotive parts, metalworking, steel, computers, consumer
8
electronics, food, beer, soap, and detergent) in three countries (Germany, Japan, and the U.S.) are
studied. Baily and Gersbach find that physical capital and embodied technology can account for part
of the productivity-differential. The major part of productivity differences, however, is to be found
elsewhere (in technology and/or organization).
[ 7 ]
regulation and the intensity of competition as a potential explanation for observed
productivity differentials. The general lesson to be drawn is that incomplete
convergence in service industry’s productivity is due to regulatory barriers and lack of
competition, causing slack and inhibiting productivity growth. Such barriers could be
created by special interest groups, trying to protect their economic interests. A case
study of banking stresses the idea that available innovations may not be adopted without
the threat of competition. Competition in the banking industry is limited by the
regulated structure of this sector, resulting from the fact that most countries considered
financial stability as more important than economic (competitive) efficiency. In the
United States, however, the regulatory environment has encouraged competition.
Overall productivity varies widely in the countries studied. Germany’s overall
productivity level in banking is about 68% of that in the United States. This productivity
gap is due to the failure to exploit economies of scale and scope in German banks with
their many small branches, and their less effective use of information technology. Part
of the emerging productivity differential between German and United States banks is
due to the fact that far fewer transactions per person passed through ATMs in Germany
than in the United States, so that German banks need more labour input to dispense
cash to their customers. The fact that new technologies such as ATMs were earlier
adopted in the United States reflects that competition in the United States banking
industry is more intense, forcing banks to cut operation costs and streamline their
operations.
  International productivity differentials in manufacturing are studied in Baily and
Gersbach (1995). The major part of the observed productivity differences is caused by
the way functions and tasks are organized, and the fact that some companies require
less labour and material input by new designs of their products.  The question then
8
arises why companies fail to exploit best-practice technologies. An illustrative example
is that German breweries are simply forbidden to adopt better technologies that are used[ 8 ]
in the United States and Japan. Baily and Gersbach suggest that exposure to the most
efficient producers through global competition will speed up the adoption of new
technology and promote efficiency.
  Besides all mechanisms driven by some explicit loss, one might argue that “In
every society, there are stabilizing forces that protect the status quo. Some of these
forces protect entrenched vested interests that might incur losses if innovations were
introduced, others are simply don’t-rock-the-boat kinds of forces. Technological
creativity needs to overcome these forces” (Mokyr, 1990, p. 12). How strong and
pervasive these pressures can be, exerted in the old days by for example guilds, has been
nicely illustrated by Olson (1982) in his book on The Rise and Decline of Nations. In
his description of the operation of the caste groups in India, he argues that these groups
controlled lines of business, kept crafts mysteries or secrets, used boycotts and strikes
and were organized with a strong emphasis on obedience to the rules of the caste ruling
out competition.
Despite overwhelming evidence of the relevance of resistance activities, more
formal analysis is scarce. A sketch of the available contributions will be discussed in the
next section.
2.2 Related theoretical literature
As mentioned earlier, the theoretical literature on technology adoption mainly focuses
on the adoption costs for firms. One important exception is Helpman and Rangel
(1998). They focus on the short-run response to an arrival of a General Purpose
Technology (further GPT), and answer the central question under what conditions the
arrival of a GPT causes a decrease in aggregate productivity. At the heart of the
analysis is a (continuous) overlapping-generations framework. Two basic effects are
distinguished, namely (i) an adoption effect and (ii) an entry effect. The adoption effect
results from the fact that the introduction of a new technology makes old experience
worthless, implying a temporary drop in productivity for those who adopt. In addition
there is an entry effect, which may be positive or negative. It is positive in case the new      Some unattractive features of the model are that it is not a general-equilibrium model and that
9
the old and the new technology can co-exist.
          Krusell and Ríos-Rull (1996) introduce a dynamic political process in the Chari and
10
Hopenhayn (1991) model and analyse stagnation and growth equilibria. Our one-shot voting approach
simplifies on the political process compared to Krusell and Ríos-Rull’s dynamic voting process (where
the current policies’ consequences for future political equilibria are taken into account). We, however,
extend their discussion by focussing on the general equilibrium effects of competition on regime
switches from stagnation to growth.
[ 9 ]
technology requires less schooling and results in students leaving school earlier than
expected (the case of technology-skill substitutability). It is negative in case the new
technology requires additional schooling and results in more people going to school
instead of producing (the case of technology-skill complementarity). The general
conclusion is that the arrival of a new GPT can trigger off a temporary slowdown in
growth. This is the more likely, the higher the required educational level to operate the
new technology, the more experience is lost upon adoption of the new technology and
the faster experience is generated when using the new technology (making adoption
more attractive).  
9
Adoption when technology arrives in a continuous stream, opposite to the once-
and-for-all nature of technological change in Helpman and Rangel (1998), is analysed
by Chari and Hopenhayn (1991). In a two-generation OLG economy they show that
vintage-specific human capital of the old, accumulated through learning-by-doing when
unskilled and young, leads to slow adoption of new technology if newborn unskilled are
highly complementary with human capital of the old.  Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996)
10
show in a similar vein that in a one-agent model, even bounded learning-by-doing might
be detrimental to growth. Abundance of expertise with a specific vintage that is non-
transferable to a new vintage (specific human capital) locks the agent in.
Complementary to our work is Caselli (1999) who analyses adoption of
technology in a model with heterogenous agents. The heterogeneity is reflected in the
cost of learning to work with the next generation technology. Where we stress the
heterogeneity on the benefit side (lifetime benefits depend on age), Caselli emphasizes
the cost side by pointing at differences in ability.
A theoretical contribution that is closely related to ours is Holmes and Schmitz
(1994, further H&S). They focus on the effects of trade on technology adoption.      Erecting a barrier increases the price of the manufacturing good relative to the no-barrier case,
11
so that real income is decreased. However, skilled workers’ income might increase if a barrier is
erected. If skilled workers are relatively scarce, a barrier causes the price of the manufacturing good
to be relatively high, as it is determined by the marginal rate of transformation of unskilled workers
between the two goods (who in both activities are equally productive). In that case a skilled worker’s
marginal product is higher with a barrier. If skilled workers are relatively abundant, their income
equals that of unskilled workers as they both produce the non-manufacturing good, in which skilled
workers have no advantage.
[ 10 ]
Workers are modelled as being skilled in that they have a technology-specific advantage
in one sector of the economy. As this relative advantage is to be lost if adoption takes
place, skilled workers might opt for resistance to a new technology. Blocking
technology is modelled as a legal ban on consumption of goods produced with the
newly available technology or on the use of the newly available technology. In a closed
economy these two are identical. The cost of blocking a technology by skilled workers,
by means of resistance, is weighted against the real income gain.   The main conclusion
11
is that tradeability of goods acts as an important disciplinary device, as non-adoption,
to keep specific rents, is ineffective because the rents will be competed away by foreign
firms who will adopt (by assumption).
Our paper differs in several important ways from H&S. Firstly, we introduce
heterogeneity by age whereas H&S distinguish workers who have or don’t have
technology specific skills. This allows us to study the relation between age structure and
technology adoption. Secondly, our paper differs from H&S with regard to competition.
We have imperfect competition, whereas H&S have perfect competition. Furthermore,
competition, in our paper is (also) a domestic concept, whereas H&S only consider
changes from autarky to free trade.
3. A simple framework
We study the adoption decision of a new technology in a simple overlapping
















      In what follows, we assume, without loss of generality, that population growth is absent. This
12
implies that P = P at all points in time. In the remainder, we will normalize P at one-third for t 
presentational convenience.
      We abstain from a discussion of inheritance of patents or ideas. The number of idea owners
13
is small compared to the total population and therefore irrelevant for the decision whether or not a new
technology will be adopted (which is assumed to be the outcome of a vote among the consumers; see
section 4). However, the number of idea owners (and thus the number of varieties of the high-tech good
produced in the economy) is assumed to be sufficiently large so that we can assume that firms compete
monopolistically (for different modes of competition we refer to Van de Klundert and Smulders, 1997).
Moreover, for simplicity, we assume that idea owners do not supply labour on the labour market.
[ 11 ]
(1)
t, a generation is born of size  . At each point in time, there are three overlapping
generations alive, the young, the middle-aged and the old. Total population size at time
t is thus equal to  .  All generations work and are equally productive.
12
Households are endowed with one unit of time, which they can use for working, leisure
or education (see below). Total leisure time (v) is thus equal to  , where l is labour
time and s is schooling time. Consumers derive utility from the consumption of a
homogeneous good, a composite of differentiated products and leisure. Besides the
workers, the economy is inhabited with N holders of ideas.  The possession of an idea
13
enables them to produce a differentiated good. They make profits which they spend on
consumption (based on the same homothetic utility function that applies to all other
consumers).
The present discounted utility ( ) of an individual born at date t is given by
where ￿<1 is the discount factor and ￿ is the relative preference for leisure. In case two
subscripts are added the former denotes time whereas the latter denotes date born.
Hence,   is utility derived from consuming a bundle of goods at time   by an
individual born at time t and   is leisure time consumed at time   by an individual
born at time t. The elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is 1/(1-￿).
For the time being we assume that consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes, i.e.
￿￿1. The instantaneous utility function then becomes linear in its arguments. The more













Y ￿ LY ,
¯ l
￿ x
      Where it leads to no confusion, we drop indices. Lower cases variables pertain to individually
14
consumed volumes (to be distinguished from macroeconomic volumes which are indicated with
capitals).  
      A discussion of this aggregation function is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer to De
15
Groot and Nahuis (1998).
      In equilibrium, it holds that all individual demands of consumers from the three generations
16





supply (l) is perfectly inelastic and equal to   (this assumption is relaxed in Appendix
D). The bundle of goods that is consumed consists out of a numeraire good (y) and a
composite of high-tech goods (labelled x)  which consists of N varieties of a quality
14
differentiated high-tech good (which are indexed i=1,…,N). The instantaneous sub-
utility function of an individual consumer with regard to the composite consumption
good is specified in Cobb-Douglas format:
This homothetic utility function applies to individuals from all three generations alive
who spend their wage income and to the idea owners who spend their profits. The
composite x is defined as  
15
where   is the individually consumed amount of the high-tech good of variety i, )
represents the taste for variety, and J measures the elasticity of substitution between any
pair of differentiated high-tech goods. The numeraire good Y is produced according to
a simple linear technology
16
where L  is the amount of labour employed to produce the numeraire good. Labour Y



















      Again, all individual demands of the three generations alive and the idea owners sum up to
17





individual firm in the high-tech sector produces according to the following technology
17
where   denotes the produced volume of the high-tech good of variety i,   is skilled
labour employed in the i-th intermediate firm,   is its labour productivity, and µ
indicates a scale effect. The labour market clears so
where   is total labour supply across all generations (in time units). Due to our
normalization, we have  , which will further be denoted as L. Note that since
workers from different age groups are perfect substitutes, we can simply add them up.
With a given number of idea holders the condition for labour market clearing
completes the description of the model. Implicitly, a perfect entry barrier is present in
the economy such that the number of firms/ideas is fixed. The sensitivity of our results
for this assumption is checked in Section 6. In solving the model, however, we will
proceed under the assumption of blocked entry.
We can now straightforwardly solve the model for a given labour productivity and
a given number of firms by solving (i) the two-step consumer optimization problem
yielding the division of income over the goods available to the consumers and (ii) the
profit-maximization problem for producers of the goods (see Appendix A.1 for a
detailed description of the model solution). This results in an allocation of labour that
looks liket1
s￿¯ st ￿ t 1
t 1 ￿ 1
      In appendix D we endogenize labour supply. In the presence of economies of scale the old
18
generation dislikes adoption even if there are no direct learning costs for the generation involved.
      This implies that the adoption decision is in some cases not Pareto-efficient. The economy as
19
such is not efficient due to distortionary pricing in the monopolistically competitive sector. 
[ 14 ]
So the size of firms in the high-tech sector will be larger the larger the supply of labour
(L) in time units, the smaller the number of producers (N), the more weight consumers
attach to the consumption of high-tech goods (￿), the smaller the distortion due to
mark-up pricing (i.e., when J is increased), and the more important economies of scale
(µ).
4. The decision whether or not to adopt a newly arrived technology
Having established the equilibrium solution of the model, we can now discuss how
consumers will react to the invention of a new technology. Suppose that at time   a
new, better technology becomes available to produce the quality differentiated high-tech
goods. When this technology is adopted, each worker has to incur a cost in terms of
foregone leisure time equal to   at time  . We assume, for simplicity, that the
technology can fully be employed in period   and is ￿ times as effective as the old
technology (￿>1). Upon effectively being used, the old technology is immediately and
fully replaced by the new technology. Two remarks are in place. First, we make the
assumption that the old experience the cost of adjustment even when they stand to lose
from the adoption of the new technology. This assumption can be justified by the simple
fact that change is disliked (in Appendix D we relax assumption).  Secondly, we
18
assume that income transfers between generations and between the holders of ideas and
workers (other than wage payments) are impossible. This is due to a hold-up problem
present in the model. Neither people from the current young generation nor the
possessors of ideas can credibly commit to transfer money since they have no incentive
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      Whether the possessors of ideas are in favour of  adoption depends on two factors, namely (i)
20




Let us now characterize the costs and benefits of adoption for each age group.
20
We are allowed to ignore the generation that enters the labour market the period after
the adoption decision is taken for two reasons. First, we think of that generation as
those currently enrolled in primary and secondary education hence their education will
be adjusted to the new dominant technology. This means that there is no additional cost
of adoption and change for them because they are well-prepared for the new
technology. Second, that generation has, in general, no suffrage and hence does not
affect the outcomes of voting.
We denote the net change in utility that results from adoption at time   for an
individual borne at   by  . So for the currently old, we get 
where the indices A and NA refer to situations with and without adoption, respectively.
In order to determine the value of this F-function, we need to establish the consumption
index c. As shown in Appendix A.2, this value can be derived as 
Since the new technology only becomes effective after one period and   is constant
(see equation (7)), the consumption index is not changed when adoption takes place and
hence  . So the currently old lose from adoption. Once the new technology
becomes effective, they have passed away. Nevertheless, they have to incur the cost of
foregone leisure. As a consequence, the currently old will be against the adoption of a
new technology. 
For the other two age groups, the returns from adoption are not necessarily
negative. On the one hand they gain due to the fact that the new technology enlarges
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equation (9)). On the other hand, however, both groups lose as some leisure time has
to be foregone. Without adoption an individual has   units of leisure, while with
adoption individuals only enjoy   time units of leisure. These costs are more likely
to exceed the benefits for the middle-aged than for the young since the former can only
benefit from the enlarged consumption possibilities for one period. This shows up in the
F-functions for the young and medium aged, that respectively look like
and
From these two equations, it is evident that a sufficient condition for the young to be
in favour of adoption is that the middle-aged are in favour of adoption ( ).
Hence, under a system of majority voting the critical question that we need to address
is whether the middle-aged are in favour or against adoption since the middle-aged have
the decisive vote. Using equation (9), we can derive that   and  ,
where ￿>1 is the measure of the increase in productivity ( ). The middle-aged
are thus in favour of adoption provided that
So adoption is preferable if the discounted benefit from accepting the new technology
exceeds the associated cost in terms of foregone leisure.
We will now proceed by characterizing the increase in h that is required to make
the group of middle-aged people just indifferent between adopting the new technology
and proceeding with the old one. This critical increase will be labelled ￿ . Since
*
 we know that there is exactly one value ￿ >1 for which middle-aged
*
consumers are indifferent, i.e. F=0. Combining equations (9) and (12), the critical value
of ￿ is easily derived as (see Appendix A.2)￿













where   is determined by equation (7). Obviously, the required productivity gain to
leave middle-aged workers indifferent is increasing in the time loss ( ). ￿  is decreasing
*
in ￿, as a loss today is more easily compensated tomorrow, if tomorrow is valuable.
The costs of adjustment (s) have so far been simply modelled as being
independent of the size of the productivity increase (￿). More realistically, we might
model the cost of adoption as consisting of an exogenous part, and a part that is related
to the size of the increase in productivity:
The parameter a>0 reflects the idea that adoption becomes more costly if the increase
in productivity becomes larger, while b>1 captures the idea that costs of adoption
increase more than proportionally with the increase in productivity. The solution of the
model can now conveniently be represented in a graphical manner as is done in Figure
1. The vertical axis in the graph depicts gross benefits of adopting the new technology
for the middle-aged consumers (i.e., the increase in utility associated with the higher
productivity, the light dashed line), costs of adopting the new technology (the heavily
dashed curve), and the net benefit (the solid line). The new technology will be adopted,








      Another alternative for endogenizing the costs of learning would be the introduction of
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technology-specific knowledge. This technology-specific knowledge may be general (that is, as a
technology is longer being used, everybody can employ it more productively), but also generation
specific (that is, older people will have more experience and can therefore use a technology more
efficiently than younger people). Both types of specific knowledge are lost upon adoption and result
in adoption being less profitable. Additionally, old people have much more to lose than young people
as they stand to lose the experience they have gained with the old technology, which makes the older
people particularly resistant to change.
[ 18 ]
Figure 1 Endogenous adoption costs
The figure reveals that adoption will occur provided that (i) the increase in productivity
is sufficiently large in order to enable the consumers to ‘recover’ their loss in utility
associated with the costs of adoption, and (ii) the increase in productivity is not too
large in order to prevent the adoption costs to dominate the gross benefits. So
improvements should not be too small, as change bears some fixed costs, but
improvements also shouldn’t be too large either as learning costs will become
prohibitive. Any factor that will increase the gross benefits of adoption or decrease the
costs will enlarge the range of technologies that will be adopted.
21
5. The effects of enhancing competition on technology adoption0￿
￿/0J
      We can also model increased competition as an increase in the number of firms producing
22
high-tech goods (N). From equation (13), it is immediately evident that an increase in the number of
high-tech firms will lower the required increase in productivity and will thus tend to foster economic
growth (note that )>1). We return to this issue in section 6 where we allow for endogenous
determination of N (which is then determined by competitive factors).
[ 19 ]
In this section, we will discuss how a change in rivalry between firms producing the
quality-differentiated product will affect workers’ resistance to change. We will model
enhanced competition as an increase in the substitution elasticity between high-tech
goods.  The question whether competition will foster the adoption of new technologies
22
and thereby foster economic growth then boils down to the question whether the
increase in productivity required to make middle-aged consumers equally well-off
becomes smaller when competition increases. Hence, we have to determine whether
 is negative. From equation (13) we can straightforwardly show that competition
will foster economic growth. This result is easily understood. An increase in
productivity increases the total cake that can be divided between workers and the
owners of ideas. In addition, the share of the increase in the cake that is obtained by the
workers positively depends on the elasticity of substitution between high-tech goods
(see Appendix A.3). If the elasticity of substitution is close to one, the owners of ideas
receive almost all of the rents associated with  the adoption of the new technology. As
a consequence, resistance to adoption by workers will be large. If, on the other hand,
most of the increase in the cake goes to the workers, resistance will be limited. This is
also illustrated in Figure 2. An increase in competition shifts the gross benefit curve




















          Fixed costs are introduced in this section only as they do not qualitatively affect the
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equilibrium with blocked entry. Without any fixed cost, the number of high-tech firms would tend to
infinity under free entry.
[ 20 ]
Figure 2 Enhanced competition
6. Free entry and the effects of tougher competition on resistance to
change
So far, we studied the characteristics of the model under the assumption that the
number of high-tech firms is exogenously given. This implies that persistent profits can
exist; profits are not competed away by entry of new firms. In a model where
knowledge is tied to firms, this assumption can be defended. However, it is interesting
to consider the characteristics of the model once we drop this assumption. Such an
exercise is interesting for various reasons. Firstly, it can be seen as a check for
robustness of previously derived results. Secondly, it is interesting as it gives additional
insights on the effects of competition on technology adoption.
The solution of the model under the assumption of free entry and exit is



































Performing the same procedure as in section 4, we can determine the critical increase
in productivity that is required for middle-aged workers to be indifferent between
adopting the new technology and sticking to the old one. This critical increase is again
given by equation (13), where the allocation of workers to the high-tech sector and the
number of firms are now given by
where   is a fixed cost. We restrict µ to be smaller than J/(J-1) to guarantee an
economically meaningful equilibrium with a positive number of firms and positive firm
size. Equation (15) says that high-tech firms become larger, the larger the fixed cost and
the stronger competition is. This is easily understood as large fixed costs and strong
competition requires firms to sell and produce a lot in order to break even. The number
of high-tech producers is determined in equation (16). There are less firms active when
fixed production costs are higher, and when economies of scale become more
important.
By substituting the latter two equations into the solution for   (equation (13)),
we can obtain a closed-form expression for   (see Appendix B). We are particularly
interested in the effect of competition on this critical productivity shift. To that end, we
need to evaluate
The first term on the right hand side is the direct effect from competition on technology







6 the direct effect captures the same mechanism as described in section 5: increased
competition lowers the price of the high-tech good and thereby increases real
income of workers which makes them more inclined to adopt the new
technology. Since profits earned by the high-tech firms are driven down to zero,
competition does not have an effect on the share of the cake that accrues to
workers; 
6 the first indirect effect is only relevant in the free entry model as it operates
through changes in the number of high-tech producers. We know that  .
When competition is intensified, mark-ups decline and less firms will survive in
the presence of fixed operation costs. Furthermore,  ; the reduction  of
product variety makes workers worse-off and hence the increase in productivity
required to keep them equally well-off increases. This “variety-effect” works
against the direct effect.
6 with respect to the second indirect effect, we know that  ; high-tech
firms become larger when competition is intensified in order to recoup their fixed
production costs. Furthermore,   if there are economies of scale in
production of high-tech goods (µ>1). So this “scale-effect” has a similar sign as
the direct effect. Competition increases firm size and results in the remaining
firms better exploiting economies of scale, thereby reducing consumer prices and
increasing their real income.
In contrast with section 4, the relationship between growth and competition is no longer
unambiguous. As shown in Appendix B, the relationship between ￿  and J  is only
*
negative, provided that the parameter measuring the taste for variety is smaller than the
mark-up (that is, )<J/(J-1)). In the special case in which the taste for variety and the
mark-up are exactly equal, the elasticity of substitution does not affect the critical
increase in productivity (this is the case that is explicitly considered by Dixit and
Stiglitz, 1977). When the taste for variety is large, productivity should increase
relatively strong in more competitive environments to make middle-aged workers￿
￿
      We refer to De Groot and Nahuis (1998) and Benassy (1998) for a discussion on these issues
24
in a slightly different context.
[ 23 ]
equally well-off.  The intuition behind this result is the following. An increase in
24
competition makes high-tech firms larger and reduces the equilibrium number of high-
tech firms (and thereby the variety of high-tech goods available to consumers). This
makes consumers worse-off. On the other hand, an increase in competition reduces the
distortion due to mark-up pricing and increases real income of consumers, which makes
them better off. When the taste for variety is low, the latter effect dominates and
increased competition needs to be accompanied by a relatively low increase in
productivity for the middle-aged worker to be equally well-off. If, on the other hand,
the taste for variety is strong, the former effect dominates and the increase in
productivity required to make middle-aged workers equally well-off upon adoption of
the new technology is larger in more competitive environments.
7. A general CES-utility function
In our basic framework we imposed perfect substitutability between consumption and
leisure. This assumption is relaxed in this section in order to study the robustness of the
previously derived results. Hence, we turn back to the CES-utility function - equation
(1) - and consider the characteristics of the model for more general values of ￿.
Analytically, the case when consumption and leisure are imperfect substitutes
(￿<1) only affects the specification of the F-function. Details can be found in Appendix
C. Since the expression for   cannot be solved in closed-form, we resort to a graphical
analysis to describe the qualitative effects from intensified competition on the critical
productivity increase at different degrees of substitution possibilities between
consumption and leisure. 
To understand the effects of competition on the willingness of consumers to
adopt an improved technology at different degrees of substitution between leisure and
consumption it is important to recognize that the decision to adopt affects consumers’
utility in essentially two ways:       Stated differently, the marginal utility of leisure positively depends on consumption, and
25
consumption is higher in a more competitive environment.
[ 24 ]
1. There is an instantaneous negative effect due to the loss in leisure associated with
learning. This instantaneous effect is more negative if competition is more fierce
as the reduction in leisure ‘hurts’ more if the consumption level is high.  The
25
better substitutes leisure and consumption are, the less the instantaneous effect
differs at different degrees of competition. In the limiting case of perfect
substitutability considered above, the negative instantaneous effect is independent
of competition. Hence, the negative learning effect is increasing in the degree of
competition (unless ￿=1) as the reduction in leisure time associated with adoption
is weighted more heavily.
2. There is a future positive effect of adoption on utility associated with increased
productivity. This positive effect is stronger the larger the productivity increase
and is reinforced by tougher competition.
There are thus two opposing effects of competition on the willingness to adopt.  This
is illustrated in Figures 3a-3c. These figures depict the F-function as a function of the
productivity increase (￿) at different degrees of competition. Each figure represents a
different case with respect to the elasticity of substitution between leisure and
consumption (i.e., ￿>0, ￿=0 and ￿<0, respectively). The first effect just described is
reflected in the fact that at a high degree of competition, F is relatively  low at ￿=1 (at
which only the first, instantaneous effect is captured by F). If the productivity increase
associated with adoption increases, F increases and the more so the stronger
competitive forces are (reflected by the relative steepness of the two F-curves).
Consumers are indifferent between adopting and keeping with the status quo if F=0.
The answer to the question whether competition is good for growth depends on
whether the F-curve associated with a high degree of competition intersects the dotted
line, representing F=0, to the left of the intersection of the F-curve associated with the
low degree of competition with the horizontal axis.[ 25 ]
Figure 3 Enhanced competition with CES-utility
In general, we can show that competition has no effect on the willingness to adopt if
￿=0 (see Appendix C). In terms of our figures, this is depicted in Figure 3b in which the
F-curves associated with different values of J intersect the F=0 axis at one single point.
The positive effect of competition on the willingness to adopt is, in other words, exactly
offset by the negative (instantaneous) effect of competition on the willingness to adopt.
In case leisure and consumption are relatively good substitutes (￿>0) competition is
good for growth (i.e. the future positive effect of competition dominates). This is
represented in Figure 3a. If on the other hand leisure and consumption are relatively bad
substitutes (￿<0) competition is bad for growth (i.e. the instantaneous effect dominates)
as depicted in Figure 3c. Summarizing: competition is good for growth provided that
consumers are sufficiently flexible in that they are willing to accept a current loss in
leisure which is to be compensated by a future increase in consumption.[ 26 ]
8. Conclusions 
Productive efficiency is largely determined by the applied technology. Two observations
stand out: first, technologies actually implemented differ vastly across countries;
second, within countries many technologies that would obviously improve firms’
efficiency are not adopted. In this paper, we provide an explanation for these
observations. It is well documented that the adoption of a new technology often
requires an investment by the firm. But the introduction of a new technology could also
turn existing operation methods obsolete, and employees may have to learn how to
operate the new technology. Since the latter effect is often ignored, we concentrated
in this paper on the benefits and costs of technology adoption for the worker who has
to get acquainted with the new technology. If the costs of adoption for the worker
exceed the benefits that can be reaped, workers will engage in activities aimed at
keeping the old technology in place. 
This paper showed by anecdotical historical evidence that resistance to change
might indeed be an important ingredient in the explanation of huge productivity
differences across countries, as well as differences in technologies employed by different
firms. Historical evidence shows that an important cause for blocked technology
adoption is resistance of workers instead of resistance of firms.
We developed a simple overlapping generations model to formalise these ideas.
The model shows that the prime motive for resistance to technology comes from the
fact that older workers have limited time to get a sufficiently substantial “return on their
investment”. Hence, ageing might also be a problem from this perspective. Moreover,
it was shown that increased competition tends to increase the likeliness of adoption and
hence accelerates growth, which is a well-documented phenomenon in descriptive
material. More specifically, it was shown that competition is good for growth provided
that consumers are sufficiently flexible in that they are willing to accept a current loss
in leisure which is to be compensated by a future increase in consumption. 
Apart from extensions discussed earlier, there are several interesting ways in
which the model could be extended and refined. The first is the introduction of[ 27 ]
imperfect substitution in production between labour from different age groups. A
second extension would be to describe the bargain over the surplus associated with the
adoption of the technology between the firm and its workers.
Although these extensions are interesting in there own right, they will not affect
the basic mechanisms described in this paper. What crucially matters for the question
whether a new technology will be adopted is the size of the rent generated with the new
technology, the speed with which this rent can be consumed and the way it is divided
over various stakeholders within the economy. 
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Appendix A. The basic model
A.1 The allocation of labour
In this Appendix, we will solve for the allocation of labour in the basic model. For this aim, we
first need to establish consumer and producer behaviour. Each consumer maximises his utility
in two steps. In the first step, he maximises his consumption index subject to his budget
constraint (where it leads to no confusion, we suppress indices):
where x refers to the demand of an individual consumer for a bundle of high-tech commodities
(with corresponding price index P ), y refers to the demand for traditional goods (with X
corresponding price P ), and I is income (which equals wage income wl for a worker and profits Y
for an owner of ideas). Our non-satiation assumption implies that the budget constraint is
always binding. Notice that profit income does not accrue to workers, but flows back to the idea
owners. The corresponding first order conditions are given by   and  . Or,
combining these two conditions,
So the income share allocated to high-tech and traditional goods is equal to ￿ and 1-￿,
respectively (and is independent of the level of income). The price index P  is then c
straightforwardly derived as 
In the second step, he maximises x subject to the income share allocated to high-tech products
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Producers in the X-sector maximise profits,  , subject to the production
technology and the demand equation for good i. From the first order condition for a maximum,
we arrive at the well-known mark-up relation
Firms in the Y-sector operate under perfect competition so
Under the assumption of symmetry of high-tech goods, we can then derive that 
Due to the utility function being homothetic, it holds that 
We can then rewrite goods-market equilibrium as
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we arrive at the solution for the allocation of labour to the high-tech sector,
which corresponds to equation (7) in the text.
A.2 The critical productivity increase
Using that   in combination with the above results, we find
Note that adoption increases h with a factor ￿ so we can derive that c =￿ c . For ￿=1, the F-
A ￿ NA
function for the medium aged is then given by
The critical productivity increase to keep the middle-aged consumers indifferent between
adopting and not adopting is found by putting F equal to zero and is given by
This expression corresponds to equation (13) in the text.
A.3 Division of the cake
The next step is to determine the effects of an increase in productivity on the share of the ‘total
cake’ that accrues to workers. This share is equal to the share that workers get in total nominal
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where   is determined from equation (A.12). According to this equation, the labour income
share increases when competition is intensified.
Appendix B. Free entry
B.1 The allocation of labour and the equilibrium number of firms
In this Appendix, we will solve the model under the regime of free entry and exit of firms. For
this aim, we need to slightly change the producer’s problem  in that we have to add a fixed cost.
We express the fixed cost in terms of labour. The introduction of this fixed cost is essential to
obtain a finite solution for the number of high-tech firms, but it does not affect the basic
conclusions to be drawn. The i-th producer’s maximisation problem thus looks like
where   denotes firm i’s fixed production costs. Since fixed production costs do not affect the
firm’s optimal pricing strategy, the mark-up relation is again given by equation (A.6). Entry of
new high-tech firms continues until profits are driven down to zero (assuming perfect divisibility
of firms). Imposing symmetry and putting   yields
This is equation (15) in the main text. Using the symmetry-assumption, labour market
equilibrium is determined by
Combination of these expressions gives the number of high-tech producers,
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B.2 The critical productivity increase
Similar to Appendix A.2 we can determine the critical productivity increase and the impact of
increased competition. Again:
Substituting (A.13), (B.2) and (B.4) in the F-function and rewriting yields:
where 
The explicit solution for ￿  follows directly from setting (B.6) equal to zero. By straightforward
*
application of the implicit function theorem the sign of   is determined by:
Since we impose µ to be smaller than J/(J-1), the sign of the derivative of the critical
productivity increase with respect to the elasticity of substitution is determined by the numerator
of (B.8). It is then straightforwardly shown that:
Appendix C. Solution of the model with a general CES-utility function
We now return to the general utility function as specified in equation (1) and no longer impose
perfect substitutability between consumption and leisure activity. All previous calculations still
hold, except the calculation of   which is now for the medium-aged based on Ft1,t1￿1 ￿ [(c
A
t1,t1￿1)￿ ￿ ￿(1￿¯ l ￿¯ s)￿]1/￿ ￿ [(c
NA
t1,t1￿1)￿ ￿ ￿(1￿¯ l)￿]1/￿
￿ ￿[(c
A
t1￿1,t1￿1)￿ ￿ ￿(1￿¯ l)￿]1/￿ ￿ ￿[(c
NA
t1,t1￿1)￿ ￿ ￿(1￿¯ l)￿]1/￿ ￿ 0.
￿￿ ￿￿c ￿ ￿ ￿(1￿¯ l)￿
c ￿ ￿ ￿(1￿¯ l)￿
1/￿
￿ c ￿ ￿ ￿(1￿¯ l ￿¯ s)￿
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1/￿
￿ 1 ￿ ￿ .
u ￿ c
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1￿￿
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Now note that  . Defining the consumption at   as c, we can
rewrite equation (C.1) as
This equation implicitly yields the solution for ￿  and is analysed graphically in section 7.
*
Finally, let us consider the special (Cobb-Douglas) case in which ￿￿0. The utility
function then simplifies to 
We can thus write the F-function as 
where .  Putting  F equal to zero, the critical productivity
increase is straightforwardly derived as
Note that this critical increase does not depend on the strength of competition as explained and
elaborated upon in section 7.
 
Appendix D. Solution of the model with a general CES-utility function
and endogenous labour supply
In this Appendix we consider the case of a CES-utility function and allow for endogenous labour
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Extensive numerical simulation, for which the set up is provided in this appendix, learns that the
lessons drawn in Section 7 remain valid when labour supply is endogenous.
The individual consumer maximises his utility in four steps. In the first step he decides
whether it is optimal to engage in resistance activity (we return to this step below). In the second
step, optimal consumption and labour input are determined. The Lagrangian corresponding to
this problem takes the following form
The first order conditions are given by
Elimination of the Lagrange multiplier ￿ from the first two FOCs yields
Or,
The third step of the optimization determines how much of consumption expenditures is spent
















































expenditures on high-tech goods is spent on varieties of the high-tech good. The solutions of
these steps are as discussed in Appendix A.1. From the Cobb-Douglas structure of the
composite good we have
Using the resulting expression for   we find
Using income-spending equality   we can derive (after some rearranging)
where
In order to determine the equilibrium of the model with endogenous labour supply, it is crucial
to recognize that there can exist two equilibria in the model: 
(A) the medium-aged are in favour of adoption. In this case, the young will also be in favour
of adoption and both engage in schooling after which adoption of the new technology
takes place. The old disfavour adoption in any case as they have nothing to gain from it
(under the assumption that µ>1);
(NA) the medium-aged disfavour adoption. In this case, it is useless for the young to engage
in schooling as the new technology will not be adopted in any case. So in this equilibrium,
nobody engages in the costly activity of getting acquainted with the new technology.
These are the only two equilibria that can exist in the model. So what needs to be done is to
determine the F-function for the medium-aged (taking into account that these are the only two
equilibria) in order to determine whether adoption will take place or not. In the first equilibrium
with adoption, we get l
A
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So we get a system of five equations in five unknowns ( ) which can
be solved and yields the solution for  . The solution for   (with the new, higher level
of productivity) is easily computed as before, under the assumption that no generation engages
in schooling. In the second equilibrium, with no adoption, we get 
So we again get a system of five equations in five unknowns ( )
which can be solved and yields the solution for  . The solution for   (with the old
level of productivity) is again easily computed. We can then establish the F-function as 
This expression can only be analysed numerically, but yields an expression for ￿ .
*
Although it is impossible to derive an analytical expression for the critical productivity
increase   one important result is easily established: relaxing the assumption that the old
generation has to engage in schooling although they have passed away when the technology
becomes effective does not alter the results. The intuition is clear: despite the fact that the old
do not lose time due to learning, they dislike the fact that the young and medium-aged learn as
their labour supply reduces consequently (and hence the prices of the high-tech good increase).[ 39 ]
Note that for this result the non-linearity or scale effect introduced by the assumption that µ￿1
is crucial.